Syrian Opposition Offensive of 2024

I. Prelude:

Since the March 2020 Idlib ceasefire agreement, large scale operations ceased between opposition and pro-government forces in Northwestern Syria. However, revolutionary groups based in northwestern Syria prepared for a resumption of hostilities, with HTS in particular strengthening its military capabilities by reforming its structures into a "conventional armed force", improving training, and setting up special forces specializing in raids and night-time operations. According to the Kyiv Post, some Islamist social media accounts said that the Idlib-based rebels received some training and other support by Ukraine's Main Directorate of Intelligence. Meanwhile, the Syrian government suffered from growing corruption, with researcher Charles Lister describing it as the "world's biggest narco state" whose "corrupt business elite and a powerful network of military commanders, militia leaders and warlords" were held together by drug trade revenue, especially trade of Captagon. Starting in late 2022, HTS forces launched a series of infiltration and sniper attacks on government forces, leading up to the offensive. In retaliation, there was shelling of Idlib Governorate as well as Russian air strikes. Aleppo had been controlled by Bashar al-Assad's government and Iranian-backed militias since the Aleppo offensive in 2016.

According to Abu Hassan al-Hamwi, head of HTS's military wing, the offensive had been planned for a year prior to its launch. Beginning in 2019, HTS developed a military doctrine aimed at transforming loosely organized opposition and jihadist fighters into a conventional military force. The group established specialized military branches, most notably a drone unit that produced reconnaissance, attack, and suicide drones. HTS additionally established coordination with southern Syrian rebels, creating a unified command structure that incorporated leaders from approximately 25 rebel groups, with the strategic objective of encircling Damascus from multiple directions. HTS initiated the offensive partly to disrupt regional powers' diplomatic normalization with the Assad regime and to counter escalating aerial attacks on northwestern Syria. The group determined that Assad's international allies were strategically constrained, with Russia committed to its war in Ukraine and both Iran and Hezbollah engaged in conflict with Israel, presenting a favorable tactical opportunity. In October 2024, a large mobilization by HTS and government forces was initiated in the Aleppo countryside, as the Syrian rebels reported that they had been preparing for months for a large-scale offensive against government forces within the city of Aleppo. On 26 November 2024, government forces artillery struck the opposition held town of Ariha, killing and injuring 16 civilians.

II. Beginning:

On 27 November 2024, HTS announced that it had launched an offensive dubbed "Deterrence of Aggression" toward pro-government forces in western Aleppo Governorate. The offensive was a response to recent artillery shelling by the Syrian government of Bashar al-Assad against rebel-held Idlib, which killed at least 30 civilians. During the first ten hours of the offensive, HTS captured 20 towns and villages from pro-government forces, including the towns of Urm al-Kubra, Anjara, Urum al-Sughra, Sheikh Aqil, Bara, Ajil, Awijil, al-Hawtah, Tal al-Dabaa, Hayr Darkal, Qubtan al-Jabal, al-Saloum, al-Qasimiyah, Kafr Basin, Hawr, Anaz and Basratoun. In addition, the 46th regiment base of government forces was besieged by the HTS and captured a few hours later. The Syrian Observatory for Human Rights reported that 37 Syrian government soldiers and allied militias and 60 fighters from the opposition forces were killed in the clashes. A Russian special forces unit was ambushed by rebels, who later posted photos of a dead Russian soldier and captured equipment. In response, Syrian and Russian forces launched aerial assaults on areas controlled by revolutionary groups. Russian fighters also conducted airstrikes around Atarib, Darat Izza, and surrounding villages, while government forces shelled rebel-controlled Idlib, Ariha, Sarmada and other areas in southern Idlib Governorate. On 28 November, HTS launched an offensive on the eastern Idlib countryside, capturing the villages of Dadikh, Kafr Batikh and Sheikh Ali as well as a neighborhood in the city of Saraqib. This advance brought them within two kilometers of the M5 highway, a strategic route that had been secured by pro-government forces in 2020. HTS also attacked al-Nayrab's airport located east of Aleppo, where Iranian-backed militants have a presence. In the latter half of the day, HTS captured the villages of Kafr Basin, Arnaz and Al-Zarba in the western Aleppo countryside, and cut off the M5 highway. The Syrian rebels had captured around 40 towns and villages in total by the end of the day.

III. Battle of Aleppo:

On 29 November 2024, rebel forces approached the outskirts of Aleppo. They took Khalsa, Al-Rashidin and Khan Tuman, where the army abandoned four T-55 tanks. The Syrian government was overwhelmed by the rebel offensive's speed, and could not organize a coordinated defense of Aleppo. The defending units were not provided with a coherent plan, instead being "told to work it out for themselves". Researchers Hassan Hassan and Michael Weiss argued that the pro-government forces "suffered a complete breakdown in command and control and morale". The main Syrian Army unit on the insurgents' path, Regiment 46, "simply collapsed". Some military formations, including the 25th Special Mission Forces Division and Republican Guard, were hastily sent to reinforce the city, and took up position at several strategic locations such as the Citadel of Aleppo. Other pro-government units withdrew southward, such as Harakat Hezbollah al-Nujaba. As the insurgents attacked, they initially bypassed heavily fortified strongholds like the Military Academy and Artillery College in favor of a speedy advance deep into Aleppo. During the afternoon, rebels entered the Hamdaniyah and New Aleppo neighborhoods in the city, after carrying out a double suicide bombing with two car bombs. In the latter half of the day, opposition forces captured five city districts, Al-Hamdaniya, New Aleppo, 3000 Apartments, Al-Jamiliya, and Salah al-Din districts. Clashes were reported elsewhere in the city, including its center. By midnight, opposition forces had captured parts of Al-Sukariyya, Al-Furqan, Al-Adhamiya, and Saif al-Dawla districts, and claimed to have had taken control of the main square of Aleppo. Around this time, the rebels also approached the Neirab camp where the local loyalist garrison consisting of Liwa al-Quds troops retreated without organizing resistance. Hours after the rebel incursion into the main neighbourhoods, thousands of civilians fled the city through the main Khanasir Athriya intersection with most heading to Latakia and Salamiya. The rebel forces issued evacuation warnings calling on residents of Aleppo to move eastwards "for your safety". Syrian state media reported that projectiles launched by the rebels hit student housing in the University of Aleppo, killing four people, including two students. In the early hours of 30 November 2024, rebel forces captured the Citadel of Aleppo and the government headquarters in the city, as well as "more than half" of the city. By morning, rebel forces had seized control of most of Aleppo, facing little resistance and forcing pro-government troops to retreat toward as-Safirah. Government forces and Iranian militias remained in control of a few neighborhoods in northeastern Aleppo. Russian forces abandoned at least three military bases around the city.

IV. Fall of Hama & Homs:

On the evening of 30 November 2024, HTS-led opposition forces rapidly advanced in the Hama Governorate, capturing dozens of towns and villages in the countryside by 7 in the evening (Local Syrian time, UTC+3:00). As the HTS forces started closing in on Hama, pro-government forces established new military positions on the outskirts of the city, including reinforcements to Jabal Zayn al-Abidin and the towns of Taybat al Imam, Qamhana, and Khitab. Additionally, Russia launched airstrikes on towns recently captured by rebels in the Idlib and Hama regions. This includes one targeting a refugee camp in Idlib city that killed nine civilians and injured 62 others, and another airstrike targeting Aleppo university hospital killed eight civilians. On 2 December, Russia again launched airstrikes on opposition-held territory, including one on Idlib city that killed 11 civilians. Opposition forces then launched a drone strike targeting pro-government military leaders near Jabal Zayn al-Abidin just north of Hama, which led to multiple deaths and injuries among their ranks. In the evening, the Russian forces carried out massive airstrikes against opposition forces, the heaviest clashes since the start of the offensive. By the end of the day, opposition forces took control of several villages and shelled Hama city, killing eight civilians, while government forces successfully defended Qalaat al-Madiq. On 3 December, opposition forces captured more than 10 towns and villages near Hama, including the towns of Taybat al-Imam, Halfaya, Soran, and Maardis. Meanwhile, fighting between government forces and SNA were ongoing in Khanasir. North of Hama, at least 17 SAA soldiers, eight HTS fighters, and two civilians were killed in clashes and airstrikes. On 4 December, pro-government forces briefly counterattacked and retook the villages of Kafr'a and Maar Shuhur, while the opposition advanced to the Ghab Plain, which serves as a gateway to the majority-Alawite coastal region of Syria. Anas Alkharboutli, a photographer working for DPA, was killed in an airstrike in Morek amidst the clashes near Hama. By the evening, opposition forces had cut off the roads connecting Hama to Raqqa and Aleppo and took control of several villages in the eastern Hama country side. Opposition forces also captured the towns of Khitab and Mubarakat, while fighting persisted in Jabal Zayn al-Abidin. On 5 December, opposition forces entered the northeastern part of Hama city amid pro-government airstrikes on its eastern side and by the afternoon, HTS-led rebels had established full control over the city, as pro-government forces withdrew. In a statement, the Syrian government reasoned its withdrawal from Hama city in concurrence with "preserving the lives of civilians". Following the fall of Hama, Hezbollah announced it was sending fighters across the border toward Hama and Homs to support government forces.

On 5 December 2024, pro-government forces withdrew from the cities of Salamiyah and Talbiseh towards the city of Homs, hours after their withdrawal from Hama as rebels approached the former town's outskirts. In the evening, opposition forces entered Salamiyah without fighting, after reaching an agreement with the city's elders and its religious Ismaili council. By the evening opposition forces had reached the outskirts of Al-Rastan and captured a pro-government military base north of it. Concurrently with the opposition advance, Russian aircraft bombed the main bridge connecting Homs and Hama, in an attempt to slow the rebel advance. On 6 December 2024, opposition forces captured five towns, and approached the outskirts of Homs, as pro-government forces withdrew from more territory. In the eastern Deir ez-Zor Governorate, pro-government forces began withdrawing from the towns of Deir ez-Zor, Mayadin, Al-Quriyah and Abu Kamal, towards the capital Damascus. By the afternoon, pro-government forces had reportedly completely withdrawn from Homs towards the city of Latakia, with only local pro-government gunmen remaining in the Shia majority neighborhoods of the city. The Syrian Defense Ministry denied reports that it had given orders to fully evacuate Homs city. Iran began withdrawing its personnel from Syria in the early hours of 6 December, pulling out top commanders of the IRGC's Quds Force and ordering evacuations at the Iranian Embassy in Damascus and at IRGC bases across Syria. Evacuating Iranians headed towards Lebanon and Iraq. On 7/8 December, it was confirmed that the Ba'athist Syrian forces withdrew from Homs, with revolutionaries afterwards shown to be celebrating in the city. This effectively cut Assad's forces, including those based from Damascus, from Syria's west coast, which houses the country's Russian bases.

V. Other Offensives:

Beginning on 29 November 2024, southern Syrian opposition groups began assaults on Daraa Governorate and As-Suwayda Governorate in Southern Syria, along the nation's border with Jordan. The offensive was publicly announced as an effort by the Southern Operations Room coordinated with the Northwestern Syria offensive to implement a multi-front advance toward Damascus. On 6 December 2024, several towns in Daraa Governorate, including Ghabagheb, al-Jiza, al-Ghariyah al-Sharqiyah, Inkhil, Barqa, Jasim, Namir, and Simlin, along with the Nasib Border Crossing, came under the control of local forces. Furthermore, more cities, including Busra al-Harir, Nawa, Mahajjah, as well as the entire Jordanian border region, fell completely under rebel control.^[The Syrian Armed Forces withdrew from their positions around the city of Daraa to reinforce Damascus but offered no resistance there, and southern opposition groups took Damascus in the early hours of 8 December, shortly before the arrival of northern opposition groups later that day. In the evening of 6 December 2024, local forces captured the regional capital of Suwayda, in southern Syria, following the pro-Assad forces' withdrawal from the city. By midnight, opposition forces in the southern Daraa Governorate captured its capital Daraa, as well as 90% of the province, as pro-government forces withdrew towards the capital Damascus.

Concurrently next, SDF captured the provincial capital of Deir ez-Zor from pro-Ba'athist forces. On 3 December 2024, the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), supported by the US-led CJTF–OIR coalition, launched an offensive on pro-government forces in the eastern Deir ez-Zor region. On 3 December 2024, the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), launched an offensive on pro-government forces near the towns of Khasham and Al-Salihiyah in the eastern Syrian province of Deir ez-Zor, and captured the village of Al-Hussainiyah. A coalition of aircraft provided support to the SDF, by targeting Iran-backed militias in the region. The SDF claimed to have captured the 7 villages under SAA control on the east bank of the Euphrates; Salhiya, Tabiya, Hatla, Khasham, Marat, Mazloum, and Husseiniya, and were incorporating them into the Deir ez-Zor Military Council. Hours later, SDF withdrew from the areas in which it advanced. On 5 December, SDF captured the Thawra oil field, the town of Resafa and strategic locations near Safyan, and Anbaj areas, located in the Raqqa Governorate, following the withdrawal of pro-government forces.On 6 December, pro-government forces began withdrawing from the towns of Deir ez-Zor, Mayadin, Al-Quriyah and Abu Kamal, towards the capital Damascus. Shortly following their withdrawal, SDF fighters captured the city of Deir ez-Zor and extended their control all the way to Abu Kamal and the Iraqi border. SDF captured the provincial capital of Deir ez-Zor from pro-Ba'athist forces, which also left the town of Palmyra in central Homs Governorate.

Finally, the Syrian Free Army, a different rebel group backed by the United States, took control of Palmyra in an offensive launched from the al-Tanf "deconfliction zone". On 6 December 2024, the United States-backed Syrian Free Army, with support from Suqour al-Sham, launched an offensive from the Al-Tanf "deconfliction zone" on the ancient city of Palmyra in the eastern area of the Homs Governorate. The United States reportedly gave logistical support to the opposition group forces.^[1] The offensive came following setbacks by the government of Bashar al-Assad on other fronts, especially after the northwestern offensive by Tahrir al-Sham. The Syrian Free Army reportedly took control of Palmyra on 7 December after clashing with regime forces before going in the direction of Damascus.

VI. Asaad Flees & Damascus Falls:

On 7 December 2024, revolutionary forces entered the Rif Dimashq Governorate from the south, and came within 20 kilometres (12 mi) of the capital Damascus. Concurrently with the advance towards Damascus, revolutionary forces in the north launched an offensive into Homs city. In the Rif Dimashq region, pro-Assad forces withdrew from the towns of Assal al-Ward, Yabroud, Flitah, Al-Naseriyah and Artouz, while rebels came within 10 kilometres (6.2 mi) of Damascus. By the evening, pro-Assad forces had left the towns on the outskirts of Damascus, including Jaramana, Qatana, Muadamiyat al-Sham, Darayya, Al-Kiswah, Al-Dumayr and sites near the Mezzeh Air Base.^[141] Revolutionary forces were later reported to have reached the suburbs of Damascus. Later that day, Bashar al-Assad fled the city, making a stopover at the Russian-operated Khmeimim Air Base near Latakia before proceeding to Moscow where he was given asylum by the Russian government. On 16 December, the Telegram account of the Syrian presidency published a statement attributed to Assad saying that he had gone to a Russian military base in Latakia Governorate "to oversee combat operations" following the fall of Damascus but was evacuated out of the country by Russia after coming under siege from rebel forces, adding that he had no intention of resigning or going into exile. In the early hours of 8 December 2024, revolutionary groups in the north captured Homs, and began advancing towards Damascus. It was also reported that rebels managed to enter the Damascus neighborhood of Barzeh. On that day, the Syrian Army command informed its officers that Assad's government had ended, and Prime Minister Mohammad Ghazi al-Jalali announced that he was ready "to cooperate with any leadership chosen by the people".

VII. Aftermath: 

After the capture of Damascus by the Southern Operations Room, Latakia and Tartus were the last two regional capitals held by Ba'athist forces. Anti-regime protests broke out in Latakia and later in Tartus, as demonstrators began to tear down posters and topple statues of Hafez al-Assad. On 8 December, the HTS began advancing on both cities, capturing them without a battle. Following the 2024 Manbij offensive, Turkish involvement in the Syrian civil war continued in mid-December with the 2024 Kobani offensive. In December 2024, the factions supported by Turkey announced they would discontinue the ceasefire with groups supported by the US, such as Syrian Democratic Forces. One news article noted: "The SNA, an umbrella of several armed factions, informed the SDF on Monday that it would be returning to 'a state of combat against us,' one of the sources briefing Al-Monitor said. The sources said negotiations between the SDF and the SNA had 'failed' and that 'significant military buildups' in areas east and west of the Kurdish town of Kobani on the Turkish border were being observed." Clashes with Ba'athist remnants were also reported in western Syria. Mohammad Ghazi al-Jalali, the outgoing prime minister and last head of government of the Ba'athist regime, agreed to lead the transitional government in a caretaking capacity. He then transferred power to Mohammed al-Bashir, prime minister of the Syrian Salvation Government, two days later. On 10 December, the transitional administration announced that it would remain in place until 1 March 2025, with all ministers from the Syrian Salvation Government taking up their same posts in the new transitional government. It was established in December 2024 by the Syrian opposition after Ahmed al-Sharaa, Emir of Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham and now the de facto Syrian head of state, appointed Mohammed al-Bashir as Prime Minister, replacing Mohammad Ghazi al-Jalali and is the  incumbent provisional government of Syria.

VIII. Sources All from Wikipedia:

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2024_Syrian_opposition_offensives

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Aleppo_(2024)

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Southern_Syria_offensive_(2024)

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Deir_ez-Zor_offensive_(2024)

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Palmyra_offensive_(2024)

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Syrian_transitional_government